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Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
Oliver Wood
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
granted a motion for summary vacatur against the Environmental
Protection Agency after environmental groups challenged the agency’s
reconsideration of the Obama-era methane rule under the Clean Air Act.
The court held that the EPA unlawfully issued a stay after it reconsidered
the rule without proper authorization. The court vacated the EPA’s stay,
one example of the Trump Administration unsuccessfully repealing
Obama-era rulemaking.
I. INTRODUCTION
The court in Clean Air Council v. Pruitt granted Clean Air Council’s
(“Environmental Petitioners”) motion to vacate the ninety-day stay
implemented by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
regarding the final methane rule (“Rule”).1 The Environmental
Petitioners claimed that under the Clean Air Act Section 307(d)(7)(B)
(“Section 307”), the EPA lacked authority to implement the stay.2 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed with the
Environmental Petitioners, concluding that the Section 307 did not
authorize the EPA to stay the rule because reconsideration of the rule
was not mandatory, given how extensively the issues under
reconsideration had been addressed in the proposed rule.3 Subsequently,
the court granted the Environmental Petitioners motion for summary
vacatur, reinstating the Obama-era rule until the EPA complies with the
appropriate procedural requirements to reconsider the rule.4
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2016, the EPA issued its final rule, implementing “new
source performance standards” governing the fugitive emissions of
methane gas in the oil and natural gas industries.5 The rule took effect on
August 2, 2016.6 Absent the stay, regulated entities would have had to
complete their initial monitoring surveys by June 3 and repair any leaks
within thirty days.7
After the EPA published the final rule, a group of petroleum industry
associations (“Industry Petitioners”) filed an administrative petition,
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which sought to reconsider the rule under Section 307.8 Section 307
mandates that if the petitioner can show the “Administrator that [1] it
was impracticable to raise such objection within [the notice and comment
period] . . . and [2] if such objection is of central relevance to the
outcome of the rule, the Administrator shall convene a proceeding for
reconsideration of the rule . . . .”9 Additionally, the EPA or court may
stay the rule for up to three months while the reconsideration
proceedings occur.10
The Industry Petitioners sought a stay pending reconsideration.11
They argued the EPA must reconsider the rule because several provisions
included in the final rule were not included in the proposed rule, which
meant they could not participate in the public comment period, as
required by the CAA.12
In April of 2017, the EPA recognized one of the Industry Petitioner’s
objections warranted reconsideration.13 The EPA ordered a temporary
ninety-day stay on June 5, 2017, which retroactively went into effect on
June 2, 2017; the day before the rule required industry to implement their
monitoring systems and repair leaks.14 On June 16, 2017, the EPA
published their intent to further look at the rule and extended the stay for
two years.15
The Environmental Petitioners filed suit in the United States Court of
Appeals, District of Columbia, seeking either an emergency stay or a
summary vacatur.16 The Environmental Petitioners argued that the EPA’s
stay violated the CAA because the issues the EPA raised regarding the
rule were addressed, and heavily deliberated, during the comment
period.17 The EPA contended, as did intervening Industry Petitioners,
that the court lacks jurisdiction over the matter and the stay is lawful
under the CAA.18
III. ANALYSIS
Two primary issues were raised for the court. First, the EPA and
Industry Petitioners contended the reconsideration of the rule was
unreviewable by the court, because the rule was not a final agency
action, and thus the court lacked jurisdiction.19 Second, the
Environmental Petitioners argued the CAA did not authorize the EPA to
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issue a ninety-day stay because reconsideration of the rule was not
mandatory.20
A. Jurisdiction Argument
The court first determined whether the EPA’s reconsideration of the
rule created a final agency action that allowed the court to review the
action.21 A final agency action “mark[s] the consummation of the
agency's decisionmaking [sic] process” and is “one by which rights or
obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will
flow.”22 Ultimately, the court concluded that because the EPA’s decision
to grant reconsideration could also result in no change to the rule, the
reconsideration was not the final agency action.23
However, the court interpreted the stay of the rule—which postponed
the rule’s compliance deadline—as analogous to a final agency action.24
Because the EPA changed the date for compliance, the court found it
equal to amending or revoking the rule.25 In prior cases, the D.C. Circuit
held: “[S]uspension of the permit process . . . amounts to a suspension of
the effective date of regulation . . . and may be reviewed in the court of
appeals as the promulgation of a regulation.”26 Thus, the court rejected
the EPA’s assertion that it lacked jurisdiction over the reconsideration of
the rule because the stay was effectively final agency action.27
Furthermore, contrary to the arguments of the EPA, the court
specifically highlighted Section 307, which gives the court the power to
issue a stay, and therefore should also give it power to deny a stay.28 The
court noted that without the ability to deny a stay, the situation would
arise with the “perverse result of empowering this court to act when the
agency denies a stay but not when it chooses to grant one.”29
B. Decision to Reconsider
The court concluded—in agreement with the Environmental
Petitioners—that the EPA’s decision to issue the ninety-day stay was
unauthorized under the CAA.30 First, while the EPA suggested it has
“broad discretion” to reconsider rules, the court highlighted the EPA’s
non-compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act, which required
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appropriate notice and comment periods.31 Second, the EPA contended it
had “inherent authority” to “issue a brief stay.”32 The court disagreed,
noting that the EPA must comply with the statute, and Section 307 does
not give the EPA authority to stay the rule unless the reconsideration was
mandatory.33
Because the EPA’s stay was only lawful if the reconsideration was
mandatory, the court reviewed whether the EPA’s stay met the two
requirements in order to reconsider.34 First, the EPA had to prove it was
impracticable for the Industry Petitioners to object during the public
comment period.35 Second, the EPA had to demonstrate the objection
was “of central relevance to the outcome of the rule.”36
The court used the arbitrary and capricious standard of review to
determine whether the EPA met the two requirements of
reconsideration.37 The decision hinged on whether the final rule was “a
logical outgrowth” of the proposed rule.38 The final rule “fails the logical
outgrowth test” if “interested parties would have had to divine the
agency's unspoken thoughts, because the final rule was surprisingly
distant from the proposed rule.”39
The court examined the record and determined that the Industry
Petitioners had ample opportunity to participate in the comment period.40
In three instances, the final rule set forth by the EPA responded directly
to the comments and information the EPA later said was “impracticable”
for Industry Petitioners to comment on.41 These public comments proved
to the court that it was not impracticable for the Industry Petitioners to
object within the public comment period, which meant the first
requirement for reconsideration was not met, thus the stay was
unauthorized.42 Without authorization for the stay, the EPA acted in
excess of its statutory authority, and the decision to impose the stay was
arbitrary and capricious.43 The court did not need to discuss the second
requirement for consideration because the first was not met.44
The dissent challenged the majority’s opinion that the stay was “final
agency action.”45 The dissenting judge reasoned that “hitting the pause
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button [was] the antithesis of ending the matter,”46 and that Section 307
clearly states that the agency can stay the effectiveness of the rule during
reconsideration.47
IV. CONCLUSION
The EPA’s action in Clean Air Council was an example of the
Trump Administration’s effort to repeal Obama-era agency rule making.
Although the court granted summary vacatur to the Environmental
Petitioners, the EPA can proceed with its June 16, 2017 Notice for
Proposed Rulemaking, so long as “the new policy is permissible under
the statute . . ., there are good reasons for it, and . . . the agency believes
it to be better.”48
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